

Model of State Building in Iran at the Stage of the Post-Islamic Republic Forecasting with Analysis of the Main Information-Oriented Directions and Traditions of State Building in Iran

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Abstract. The purpose of this article is to identify the general socio-cultural picture by studying the role of religious and philosophical foundations of Iran in state building, the possibilities of the "media and information environment" in influencing the perception of the state model in society, the role of education and the level of culture in Iran in state building, the participation of political parties and civil society in the country in state building, economic factors in state building in Iran, the behavior of the national bourgeoisie. The article also aims to provide political forecasts through scientific analysis of Iran's historical experience and the impact of contemporary geopolitical conditions on the political landscape of the Iranian state. The aim of the work of the experts of the Analytical Center "Crossmedia" is to generalize, using the method of comparative analysis, the traditions of state building in Iran that have developed over the past hundred years, in the context of the current level of development and the interests of third parties. Approaching the problem from a historical point of view, it is proposed to analyze the proposed model of the state, identifying the active participants of the post-Islamic republic era against the backdrop of modern geopolitical conditions. As a result of the study prepared by experts of the analytical center "Crossmedia", a model of a comprehensive approach to issues of state building in the post-Islamic Republic of Iran is proposed. Despite the large volume of material in scientific and popular literature on various episodes of the problem of the political structure and prospects of Iran, the proposed comprehensive approach is presented for the first time.

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to determine the role that existing religious structures will play in the future state-building of Iran, the possibilities of the "media and information environment" that will influence the public's perception of the state model to be established, the role that the level of education and culture in Iran can play in state-building, the participation of political parties and civil society in the future planning of the state, the role of national forces in the state-building of Iran, the influence of economic factors, the national bourgeoisie and the general socio-cultural landscape in order to determine forecasts.

It also examines the historical experience of Iran and the forces that can influence the political landscape of the Iranian state of the past and the current geopolitical conditions, and we will try to make political forecasts through scientific analysis. The study of the experts of the Crossmedia Analytical Center is to study the current level of development and the possibilities of "third forces" intervention in the process of state-building using the method of comparative analysis of the traditions of state-building formed in Iran over the past hundred years. Approaching the problem from a historical perspective, an analysis of the state model that can be proposed by identifying active political participants in the post-Islamic republic period against the backdrop of modern geopolitical conditions is considered. The study, prepared by experts from the Crossmedia Analytical Center, examines the role that religious institutions, cultural and secular groups, political organizations and civil society participants, representatives of the national bourgeoisie and economic factors can play in the future political structure of the country. There is a large amount of material in the scientific and popular literature on various episodes of the problem of the political structure and future prospects of Iran, but a comprehensive approach to the problem in the context of the influence of modern trends on historical traditions is presented for the first time.

2. TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN IRAN: IN THE CONTEXT OF HISTORICAL LEGACY AND MODERN ALTERNATIVES

The ideological foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran rests on two pivotal structural components: the theory of *Wilayat al-Faqih* (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), as one of the highest forms of Shi'a political theology, and a nationhood construct based on Persian language and culture. These two elements serve as mutually reinforcing mechanisms to preserve state legitimacy and define the regime's deep structural code.

The concept of *Wilayat al-Faqih*, formulated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was integrated into the constitutional framework after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. This theory asserts that a qualified jurist possesses the divine right to govern during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam¹. Theocratic governance merges religious legitimacy with political authority, creating a borderless structure of rule.

Concurrently, Persian language and culture have been institutionalized as the medium of state administration. Education,

¹Brumberg, Daniel. *Reinventing Khomeini*. University of Chicago Press, 2001
<https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/R/bo3632284.html>

media, official documentation, historiography, and public discourse are all structured in Persian². This approach goes beyond mere cultural chauvinism, constituting a form of institutional assimilation. Ethnic minorities such as the Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchs have faced marginalization both culturally and politically.

The ideology of a "Unified Iranian Identity" integrates not only Persians but also Turks—who constitute nearly half the population—into a shared cultural code. While Persian has functioned as a *lingua franca*, conflating its literary output with an ethnic Persian identity amounts to cultural imperialism.

One of the leading scenarios in current intellectual discourse about Iran's political future involves structural transformation without the complete collapse of the existing ideological system. This model envisions incremental reforms under conservative clerical control that seek to retain legitimacy while mitigating public discontent. It suggests a symbolic or consultative role for the *Wilayat al-Faqih* institution, with real political authority shifting to elected bodies. In essence, it preserves the Islamic Republic's formal structure while altering its de facto power dynamics.

Assessing the feasibility of this model requires acknowledging inherent contradictions in Iran's ideological framework. The Islamic Republic represents a synthesis of Shi'a theocracy and Persian ethnocentrism—a synthesis that, though superficially coherent, conceals deep ideological and functional tensions. Shi'ism, as a transnational religious doctrine, aims to influence Shi'a communities beyond Iran, whereas Persian cultural nationalism denies Iran's multiethnic reality and promotes monoethnic hegemony. This tension has manifested as both ideological and institutional conflict³.

These contradictions have practical implications. Iran allocates resources to export Shi'ism abroad, while enforcing assimilative policies at home against non-Persian ethnic groups. Therefore, a viable reform scenario must accommodate both structural flexibility in theocratic governance and institutional recognition of ethnocultural pluralism. Otherwise, softening religious rule may inadvertently intensify ethnic centralism, increasing the risk of internal fragmentation⁴.

Comparatively, this reform model parallels China's post-Mao transition from ideological rigidity to technocratic governance under a symbolic communist framework. Similarly, Iran could gradually marginalize the *Wilayat al-Faqih* institution while enhancing the authority of elected and technocratic organs⁵. However, unlike China, Iran's theocracy is both politically and theologically entrenched. Diminishing the role of the Supreme Jurist could provoke a theological crisis, as Shi'a jurisprudence portrays the jurist's leadership as both a legal and spiritual necessity⁶.

Another obstacle to this model is the persistence of Persian cultural chauvinism as a foundational ethnic pillar. Should the system relinquish *Wilayat al-Faqih* while maintaining monoethnic Persian dominance, the resulting vacuum may not foster pluralism but rather reinforce ethnonational hegemony. This could incite stronger separatist demands from Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Arab, and Baluch populations. Conversely, dismantling Persian ethnocentrism alongside theocratic elements would necessitate a new constitutional framework accommodating multiethnic and multicultural governance.

The sustainability of a reformist trajectory in Iran hinges on several critical conditions:

- Theological adaptation to the symbolic role of religious legitimacy;
- Institutional recognition of ethnocultural diversity;
- Devolution of executive power to elected bodies and technocratic administration.

Absent these, weakening religious structures may simply empower Persian ethnonationalism, triggering deeper ideological crises.

The widening disjunction between Iran's demographic reality and its ideological architecture also undermines reformist continuity. As of 2024, approximately 65% of Iran's population is under 35 (Statista). This youth cohort largely identifies neither with the Islamic Revolution nor with the ideological principles of *Wilayat al-Faqih*. Socialized through global, secular digital networks, they gravitate toward individual rights, equality, and freedom of expression⁷.

The mass protests of September 2022 symbolized not merely political dissent but a profound delegitimization of the theocratic regime. The slogan "Woman, Life, Freedom" reflected a universalist call for rights transcending gender, ethnic, and religious boundaries⁸.

Even within the clerical establishment, ideological fragmentation has intensified. While ultraconservatives view *Wilayat al-Faqih* as divinely sanctioned and immutable, reformists argue for its symbolic reinterpretation. The absence of consensus has paralyzed decision-making and exacerbated inter-institutional conflicts⁹.

The reform-oriented transition model proposed by religious conservatives, which envisions a symbolic transformation of the *Wilayat al-Faqih* institution and the empowerment of elected bodies, is both ideologically and institutionally cosmetic and transitional. This approach, while attempting to visually soften the current structure, fails to address society's demand for deep transformation. Iran's youth, who constitute the majority of the population, perceive such reforms as insincere and ineffective¹⁰.

Even if implemented, the durability of this model remains questionable. It does not satisfy the demand for radical change among the younger generation and lacks ideological depth to restore legitimacy to the current system. More critically, such a model could merely delay the regime's collapse rather than prevent it. Iranian society increasingly calls for a new constitutional, ideological, and cultural model. This alternative must be based on secularism, multiethnic inclusivity, legal equality, and genuine

² Keddle, Nikki R. *Modern Iran*. Yale University Press, 2006
<https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300117487/modern-iran>

³ Khosrokhavar, Farhad. *Iranian Society: Between Secularization and Theocracy*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009
<https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230628417>

⁴ Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. *Iranian Intellectuals and the West*. Syracuse University Press, 1996
<https://www.syracuseuniversitypress.syr.edu/product/Iranian-Intellectuals-and-the-West,685.aspx>

⁵ Bell, Daniel A., Feng Tang. *The China Model*. Princeton University Press, 2015
<https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691169692/the-china-model>

⁶ Soroush, Abdolkarim. *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam*. Oxford University Press, 2000
<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/reason-freedom-and-democracy-in-islam-9780198293038>

⁷ Rahimi, Babak. "Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3, 2008
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26398181>

⁸ Khiabany, Gholam. *Iranian Media: The Paradox of Modernity*. Routledge, 2010
<https://www.routledge.com/Iranian-Media-The-Paradox-of-Modernity/Khiabany/p/book/9780415480367>

⁹ Moslem, Mehdi. *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*. Syracuse University Press, 2002
<https://www.syracuseuniversitypress.syr.edu/product/Factional-Politics-in-Post-Khomeini-Iran,252.aspx>

¹⁰ Gheissari, Ali, Vali Nasr. *Democracy in Iran*. Oxford University Press, 2006
<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/democracy-in-iran-9780195183909>

political participation.

Among the models under debate is a return to the Pahlavi monarchy, a secular, authoritarian, pan-Persian nationalist state. This model is promoted by diaspora communities and elites who enjoyed privilege before the 1979 revolution. Here, state legitimacy is divorced from religion and grounded in a homogenized Iranian identity rooted in Persian language, culture, and history. Zoroastrian heritage, especially its ethical dualism (Asha-Druij), is ideologically instrumentalized to project Iran as both an ancient civilization and a quasi-European cultural entity¹¹.

However, this model faces three critical challenges: weak social roots of Zoroastrianism, resistance from the theological establishment, and lack of institutional organization¹². In practice, the Pahlavi regime imposed a centralized structure, cultural repression, and pan-Persian assimilation. Non-Persian groups such as Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchs were denied cultural and educational rights¹³.

Consequently, reviving this model is largely unacceptable to Iran's non-Persian populations. The secular-liberal Western model—based on separation of religion and state, rule of law, multiparty democracy, and civil society engagement—also features in future scenarios. Inspired by French, German, and American legal-administrative traditions, it promises inclusive governance. However, historical absence of institutionalized democracy in Iran, combined with entrenched monoethnic and ideological traditions, renders this model highly idealistic.

Iran's governance has historically alternated between monarchy and theocracy. This dual structure is not accidental but reflects deep-seated cultural and ethnic divisions. Since the Sasanian era, ideological power has largely been controlled by Persians, from Zoroastrianism to Shi'ism¹⁴. Meanwhile, political and military leadership has often been in Turkish hands, especially during Seljuk and subsequent dynasties¹⁵. This system resembles the Zurvanite monodualism, wherein the state comprises two ethno-functional pillars: Turks for power and Persians for ideology.

Within this context, Western liberal models encounter serious constraints. Lack of pluralistic tradition, unresolved ethnic tensions, and the absence of consensus on secular values hinder implementation. Still, increasing support for secularism among urban youth and intellectuals hints at long-term cultural shifts. Scholars like Soroush and Shariati propose an Islamic-democratic synthesis, wherein religious values can complement democratic governance¹⁶.

The Qajar dynasty, often reduced to a pre-modern monarchy, actually represents Iran's first experiment with multiethnic governance and legal modernization. The dynasty's Turkish origin, together with its efforts during the 1906 Constitutional Revolution, laid the foundation for constitutional monarchy and legislative governance. The Qajars sought to institutionalize multiethnic participation, integrating Persians, Turks, Kurds, Gilaks, and others within a legal framework¹⁷.

The Qajar model's emphasis on ethnic inclusion and legal modernization contrasts with both Shi'ite theocracy and Western secular liberalism. Its value lies in combining Islamic principles, Persian-Turkish synergy, and constitutional reform. Reimagined as a symbolic monarchy fused with democratic representation, this model offers both historical continuity and future viability.

However, practical implementation would require public consensus, political will, and strategic communication. Though Qajar heirs currently lack formal political role, they possess symbolic significance. The feasibility of monarchy among youth and potential resistance from ultra-Shi'ite and nationalist circles remain open questions.

3. PARTICIPATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN STATE BUILDING IN IRAN

Public organizations are a broad concept that encompasses various structures and groups participating in the political life of society. The emergence and formation of such organizations in different countries of the world manifested themselves with different characteristics in different temporal and spatial conditions. Public organizations include various forms of civil associations that interact with both state institutions and public organizations, political parties, movements and authorities and influence political processes. There is little information about the emergence and activities of such organizations over the past hundred years of the political and social history of Iran, and the organizations that have emerged are extremely specific. As public associations, one can mention the "Masonic" organizations that emerged in the second half of the 19th century in Iranian geography. Although there is little information about these organizations, they played an important role in the political life of Iran. It is claimed that the first political parties in the history of Iran were founded by Armenians. Sources indicate that "the Social Democratic Hunchak Party, which was the first socialist party in Iran, was created within the Armenian Revolutionary Federation of Iran – Dashnaksutyun Party in the 1890s."¹⁸ However, we know that these organizations have no socialist or democratic essence, that they consist of nationalist and extremist groups, that they have created armed groups in the territories of various countries, that they are engaged in banditry and political terrorism.

The Ichtimayun-e Amiyun Party, founded in Baku by migrant workers from southern Azerbaijan in the 1900s, later moved its center of activity to the city of Tabriz. In 1906, it actively participated in the adoption of the constitution and the establishment of the parliament, and these parties became the main parliamentary forces of the country.¹⁹ In 1918, the Democratic Party split and ceased its activities a year later.

At the beginning of the 20th century, events taking place in the Russian Empire began to influence the socio-political life of

¹¹ Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. *Iranian Intellectuals and the West*. Syracuse University Press, 1996
<https://www.syracuseuniversitypress.syr.edu/product/Iranian-Intellectuals-and-the-West,685.aspx>

¹² Keddie, Nikki R. *Modern Iran*. Yale University Press, 2006
<https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300117487/modern-iran>

¹³ Afshar, Haleh. *Islam and the Post-Revolutionary State in Iran*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2006
<https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230595846>

¹⁴ Arjomand, Said Amir. *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam*. University of Chicago Press, 1984
<https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo5962657.html>

¹⁵ Frye, Richard N. *The Golden Age of Persia*. Phoenix Press, 2000
(Köhnə nəşr, info: <https://www.worldcat.org/title/golden-age-of-persia-the-arabs-in-the-east/oclc/40676563>)

¹⁶ Soroush, Abdolkarim. *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam*. Oxford University Press, 2000
<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/reason-freedom-and-democracy-in-islam-9780198293038>

¹⁷ Shaffer, Brenda. *Borders and Brethren*. MIT Press, 2002
<https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/borders-and-brethren>

¹⁸ Kəsrəvi Ə. İranın məşrutə inqilabının tarixi. 2 cildə, Almaniya, Essen.2003.650 s.

¹⁹ Mamedova S.J. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN IRAN AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY Institute of Oriental Studies named after Z. M. Bunyadov of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan Azerbaijan, Baku DOI: 10.25688/20-76-9105.2023.52.4.09

Iran. Political organizations that emerged in the cities of the Caucasus in particular found their echo in the northern regions of Iran, and a number of organizations were created.²⁰ The creation of socialist, democratic and nationally oriented parties did not receive widespread support from the Iranian people, since the institutionalized Islamic Shiite worldview had deeply penetrated the daily life of the people, and there were weak ideas in society about the existence of an alternative. In the 1920s-1925s, there were various political groups in Iran called the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, and the Liberals, one group of which supported Pahlavi's rise to power, the other opposed it, and ultimately none of these groups organized themselves seriously or participated in the future state-building of the country. Reza Shah's political repression began in 1927.²¹ In the "1920s" of the 20th century, social democratic leaders were arrested and sentenced to long prison terms for their participation in the Second International. In 1937, at the end of the Third International, a large group of political and ideological leaders were arrested again, and the establishment of political organizations in Iranian geography began after the entry of Soviet troops into Iran in 1941.

In 1927, the Pahlavi Minister of State Teymourtash, following the example of Mussolini's party and Atatürk's parties, founded a new pro-government and pro-Shah party, Progress (Taraqqi). This party operated for five years, and after Teymourtash was arrested on charges of "treason", the party was also liquidated. During the Pahlavi era, they began to implement the doctrine of "religion-state and nation-religion", which was supposed to express, on the one hand, the idea of Iranian Aryanism, and on the other hand, the Shiite difference in Islam. The Pahlavis, who put forward a model of isolationism in both nation and religion, aggressively fought against all sorts of parties and ideologies and tried to create an Iranian model as an alternative to them. For this purpose, famous Iranian linguists and historians were brought in, and there was no place for free-thinking intellectuals in the closed system of government of the country. An important stage in the history of party building occurred after 1941. The entry of Soviet troops into Iran from the north of Iran and the deployment of British troops from the south began to manifest themselves in the form of the emergence of different forces and defenders of different interests in the country. The Tudeh Party, which called itself the Marxist-Leninist People's Party of Iran, the self-proclaimed nationalist parties "Iran" and "Justice", pro-Nazi parties and anti-communist parties were created. Also, on the basis of the monarchist parliamentary faction, the "National Unity Party" was created, and they even began to call themselves the "People's Party" in August 1944.

In September 1945, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (Firga) was established by S.C. Pishevari.²² Three months after its establishment, it united the northern provinces of Iran (South Azerbaijan) and proclaimed the Azerbaijan National Government and within a year did a lot of work to create national statehood. In December 1946, the ADF, which had lost thousands of supporters during the attack of the Pahlavi troops with the support of England, was forced to emigrate. The ADF, which resumed its activities in exile, supported the revolution of 1979, and many party members were executed during the repressions of 1982. The party was forced to rebuild its organizations in exile again and continues its activities to this day. Considering that the national idea could cause serious complications in Iranian geography, in 1947 another pro-Shah party was created - the "Arian" Party, financed by the Shah's palace. The Iranian regime suppressed the national movements in Azerbaijan and Gilan, and the rising national thought was aware of their influence. Therefore, the movement "Iranism-Aryanism", which propagated the national idea in the country, began to gain support.

Members of the Aryan Party and their armed detachments actively participated in the overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddegh. In 1949, Mohammad Mosaddegh and a number of secular intellectuals with nationalist, liberal and social democratic political orientation created the "Iranian National Front" on the basis of the Iran Party. Although the "Front" was in power for several years, it lost power after the coup of 1953 and began to operate underground. During the Revolution of 1979, the "National Front" began to operate openly in the country and supported the establishment of the Islamic Republic.²³ It was banned as a party in July 1981 and, although officially an illegal organization in Iran, it still continues to operate. After the 1953 coup, martial law was imposed in Iran and all legal activity was banned. Liberalization resumed only in 1957 with the lifting of martial law and the creation of a state-oriented party.

In 1957, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi decided to create a two-party system in Iran following the example of the United States. The 37th Prime Minister of Iran, Manouchehr Eqlbal, was a monarchist, national conservative (Melliyoun), while the Minister of the Interior, Amir Asadullah Alam, created a liberal opposition organization, the People's Party (Mardom). In 1963, a new ruling party of the "managed" two-party system, Iran Novin (New Iran), was created on the basis of the Melliyoun Party. The party was headed by Iranian Prime Ministers Hassan Ali Mansour and Amir Abbas Hoveyda. In 1975, the Mardom Party merged with the Iranian Nation's Renaissance Party (Rastakhiz), laying the foundation for a one-party system in Iran.

The emergence and relatively free activity of democratic political parties in Iran began after the 1979 revolution, and this process continued with various restrictions until 1982. After the repressions of 1982, the Islamic Republic of Iran, promoting religious ideology as a state model, did not allow the activity of any secular ideology and subjected such parties and organizations to severe persecution.

A number of researchers divide the history of the emergence of political parties in Iran into three stages. 1905-1953, 1953-1979 and the stage after 1979.²⁴ Such periodization is extremely subjective and does not express the essence of the political, cultural and economic processes taking place in Iran.

Attempts to divide the ethnic groups that could organize a national movement in Iran into Iranian-speaking ethnic groups, Turkic-speaking ethnic groups and Arabic-speaking ethnic groups are also an incorrect approach. It is wrong to determine the dominant forces in the country and draw conclusions by showing that Iranian-speaking peoples make up 67 percent of the population, Turkic-speaking peoples make up 30 percent of the population, and Arabic-speaking peoples make up 2.4 percent of the population.²⁵ There is a very large mass of people in Iran who have distanced themselves from their ethnic identity over the past hundred years, who belong to centrist thinking and Iranian identification, and their special weight in political organizations plays an important role.

Since 1982, only parties, organizations, and groups based on Islamic religious doctrine have been allowed to operate in the country. Thus, the religious doctrine was also revised, and only groups that adopted the "vilayet-i-faqih" model could operate. Organizations with other religious orientations were subjected to severe repression and were forced to emigrate from the country.

²⁰ Kəsrəvi Ə. İranın məşrutə inqilabının tarixi. 2 cildə, Almaniya, Essen.2003.650 s.

²¹ Kazimi P.F. İran üzərində yüz illik eksperiment <https://crossmedia.az/az/article/29114>

²² Kazimi P.F. Seyid Cəfər Pişəvəri və Güneydə Milli Azərbaycan Hökuməti <https://crossmedia.az/az/article/31792>

²³ Political Party in Islamic Republic of Iran: A Review Hossein Asayesh, Adlina Ab. Halim, Jayum A. Jawan & Seyedeh Nosrat Shojaei. Journal of Politics and Law Vol. 4, No. 1; March 2011. www.ccsenet.org/jpl

²⁴ Ravandi-Fadai L.M. Politəşkiye partii i qruppirovki İrana. Moskva, 2010.216 s.

²⁵ Kazimi P.F. İranın müasir etno-mədəni mənzərəsi <https://crossmedia.az/az/article/19461>

Among the political organizations that emigrated, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party became more organized than others and was able to maintain its organizational structure, ideological platform, the arrangement of its members and connections with institutions inside the country. During the years of emigration, many Iranian political parties had to reconsider their programs of action, change their tactics and strategy of struggle, and a number of organizations disintegrated and ceased their activities. Along with the emigration of Iranian political parties and organizations, a large number of people from among the educated and intelligent population of the country also emigrated. Between 1982 and 1988, hundreds of thousands of people emigrated from Iran to European countries, and this process continues today.²⁶ The Iranian state also expanded its policy of sabotage within the emigration groups, taking advantage of the flow of emigration.

Maintaining a political organization in exile, providing its financial resources, ensuring the security of the organization and continuing its ideological activities inside the country required serious financial support, and many groups fell under the influence of various states. The radical political groups "Mujahideen" were no exception.

The modern Iranian party system is certainly different from similar systems adopted in the world. However, the idea that "there are no political parties in Iran in the Western sense" is also incorrect. The analyses of these analysts, such as "Iranian parties are groups consisting of supporters of a certain politician, which operate only during election campaigns and disappear after the elections", incorrectly assessed the specifics of Iran. Their headquarters, permanent branches in districts and cities consist of an extensive infrastructure of mosques. The parties of the Islamic Republic of Iran do not aim to seize political power, since the real power in Iran is held by the Supreme Leader, who is elected by the Council of Experts (Shurae Khibraghan) and is responsible only to him. From this point of view, political groups and organizations can exist and operate only within the framework of the Iranian political model of the state.

It is the Supreme Leader who determines the general policy of the country and supervises the implementation of the general political line of the state, exercises general command of the Armed Forces, resolves disputes between the three branches of government and appoints representatives to key government positions. This model of governance could be considered ideal if the decisions of the "vilayet-e-faqih" were not subject to manipulation after the death of R. Khomeini. Experience shows that serious conflicts will arise when appointing his "successor" after the death of A. Khamenei. Instead of the rule of the "faqih", a religious-clan rule has formed in Iran.

Those who represent the groups represented in the parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran as political organizations or factions also know that the composition of these representatives is determined by the leader, and representatives who do not hold any position outside the central ideology can express themselves only in the distribution of the budget and lobbying activities.

In the 1980s, the only legal party in Iran was the Islamic Party of Iran (IPI), founded by Ayatollah Khomeini on February 19, 1979, two weeks after the revolution, to promote the establishment of an Islamic republic in the country. By the mid-1980s, the party's membership had reached 5 million. Gradually, the struggle between the various factions within the IIP intensified. The discussions mainly concerned the Iran-Iraq War, the issue of opening the country to foreign capital, the dissemination of the ideas of the Islamic revolution, some aspects of economic policy (primarily state regulation of the economy), and the degree of influence of religion on political life. It was noted that the absence of other political forces that could compete with the IIP contributed to the fragmentation of the party, and on June 2, 1987, after Khomeini approved the proposal of Rafsanjani and Khamenei, the party ceased its activities.²⁷ Although the IIP was officially dissolved "because it had achieved its historical goals", it was generally acknowledged that it had actually disintegrated due to internal disagreements. Among the possible reasons, the most dangerous was that the party had become "a stronghold of radical activists supporting Musavi".

As can be seen, Islam is still the alternative to Islam in Iran's political palette. Despite the past 45 years, the concept of a monolithic Islam has not been formed, and in some cases, antagonistic contradictions continue within religious clans. Islamic religious groups have become more clannish than ever before, and are mainly concentrated in three large groups. The Tehra (center) group, which is the main center of power, the Qom theologians as the center of Islamic science, and the Mashhad theologians group, which holds the main economic levers in its hands.

At the stage of the post-Islamic republic in Iran, one can predict the creation of "various" parties and political organizations. However, three directions will attract attention as the main centers of power due to their ideological orientations. The first group of political organizations will gather around themselves the bulk of the masses as national organizations, the second force will be represented by national and regional religious figures who will try to seize the initiative, and the third group will form a cosmopolitan elite defending the integrity of Iran.

4. CONCLUSION

Iran is a rich country. However, the Iranian people have never used this wealth and have always been far from improving their social and cultural life and making various plans.

The Iranian Pahlavi family took with them large financial reserves of the country, an amount of approximately 60-80 billion US dollars. In the 70s of the 20th century, this fund was a large enough financial resource that neighboring countries did not have such financial reserves.

The Islamic Republic of Iran also directed the country's national income into political and ideological channels, on the one hand, spending it in irrational areas, and on the other hand, as a result of incompetent management, corruption and budget embezzlement became commonplace in Iran.

During the Pahlavi era, there was no social security, health insurance and simplified medical services, compulsory and mass education system in the country. Children from an early age were involved in heavy physical labor, and illiteracy, ignorance and religious fanaticism were at their peak in the country. Although the aristocratic neighborhoods of northern Tehran in the 1960s and 1970s created a modernist image of Iran for visitors and journalists, the country was governed by feudal relations.

In the last 50-70 years, the bulk of the Iranian economy was tied to the sale of hydrocarbon resources. Traditionally an agricultural country, Iran also dealt with the sale of agricultural products for 20-30 years, and economic sanctions and the lack of banking services do not allow this sector to be economically efficient.

The country's transport infrastructure was also not formed for ideological reasons. 80-90 percent of domestic transportation is carried out by road. Due to sanctions, the country does not have an air fleet, and rail transportation covers a limited area of the

²⁶ Müasir İranın milli mənzərəsi və milli qüvvələr <https://crossmedia.az/az/article/34094>

²⁷ Statista. "Iran: Age structure of population 2024." Statista Research Department, 2024 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/242128/iran-population-by-age-groups/>

country.

Despite various restrictions, young people in modern Iran are rapidly integrating into the "Internet age" and are active participants in global information processes. It is becoming increasingly difficult to keep them captive to the system of religious-feudal relations, keeping them under information restrictions. Nowadays, the statement of Iranian clerics about "appointing Qasem Soleimani, killed as a terrorist, as a personal assistant to Hazrat Fatima in Paradise" already causes irony among the youth, and there is no trace left of the mass asceticism observed in the 70s of the 20th century. Therefore, the adaptation of the country's economy to the level of modern requirements, the prospect of life in the country with hope and a future for the young generation of the country will play an important role in the post-Islamic republican state-building. In contrast to the traditional conservatism in the state-building of Iran, it is expected that the post-Islamic republican stage will be dominated by young people.

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