Reconstructing Presidential Emergency Legislative Powers: A Constitutional Analysis of Urgency Doctrine and Checks and Balances in Indonesia

Abstract

This study analyzes the shifting authority in legislative formation under the amended 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which grants the power to initiate laws to the House of Representatives (DPR) with the President's approval. However, the President retains the authority to enact emergency government regulations equivalent to laws under specific urgent conditions, as specified in Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Historically, all presidents have exercised this constitutional decree authority, although based on differing interpretations of the term "compelling urgency" and influenced by the dynamics between the executive and legislative branches. This normative legal research, supported by empirical legal materials and statutory approaches, reveals that emergency legislative authority remains essential for resolving crises without the delay of standard legislative processes. The study emphasizes the importance of checks and balances among the President, DPR, and the Constitutional Court. Particularly, the Constitutional Court plays a critical role in reviewing the legitimacy of such presidential actions, as affirmed in Decision No. 138/PUU-VII/2009. Therefore, a clear separation of powers is vital in restructuring the application of emergency legislative authority within Indonesia's constitutional framework.